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Abstract
We empirically investigate the effects of fiscal policy on bank balance sheets, focusing on
episodes of fiscal consolidation. To this aim, we employ a very rich data set of individual
banks’ balance sheets, combined with a newly compiled data set on fiscal consolidations. We
find that standard capital adequacy ratios such as the Tier-1 ratio tend to improve following
episodes of fiscal consolidation. Our results suggest that this improvement results from a portfolio
re-balancing from private to public debt securities which reduces the risk-weighted value of
assets. In fact, if fiscal adjustment efforts are perceived as structural policy changes that improve
the sustainability of public finances and, therefore, reduces credit risk, the banks’ demand for
government securities increases relative to other assets.
JEL Classification: E62, G11 G21, H30.
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1 Introduction
The interdependence between public and bank balance sheets has been a fundamental aspect of the
financial and economic crisis which, in some European countries, turned into a sovereign debt crisis
in mid-2010. The strong loosening of fiscal policies as a reaction to the severe economic downturn in
2008/09 coincided with sharp increases in deficit and debt ratios. At the same time, the combination
of large fiscal imbalances and low growth potential as well as structural weaknesses in the economy
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or the financial system led markets to increasingly challenge the sustainability of public finances
in some countries. The related abrupt change in the market perception of sovereign risk in turn
weakened bank balance sheets and resulted in an adverse feedback loop between sovereign and
banking risk (see, e.g., Bank for International Settlement (BIS) (2011)).
It is therefore widely agreed that sizable and sustained fiscal adjustments will eventually be
necessary to restore sound fiscal positions and ease financial market pressures. Consequently, most
industrialized countries have by now announced medium-term consolidation strategies which would
lead to a significant fiscal tightening over the coming years. In this context, this paper analyzes the
effects of fiscal consolidations on banking sector stability.
We mainly see two channels through which fiscal adjustment could affect bank balance sheets.
First, a direct effect of fiscal consolidation runs through the portfolio choice of banks. If a fiscal
adjustment is perceived to reduce the credit risk of a sovereign borrower, a bank’s demand for the
bonds of this issuer should increase relative to other assets, thereby changing the bank’s portfolio in
the direction of a lower risk composition. A second indirect channel runs through the macroeconomic
effects of fiscal contractions. Based on the standard Keynesian view, a fiscal tightening would exert
a negative impact on GDP in the short run which tends to reduce banks capital bases, e.g. due to
loan losses, and therefore weaken standard measures of capital adequacy (see, e.g., Goodhart et al.
(2004)).
Controlling for the indirect macroeconomic channel, we test the portfolio choice hypothesis using
a very rich data set of individual bank balance sheet observations for 17 industrialized countries,
from 1994 to 2009. As a measure of fiscal consolidations, we rely on a new data set constructed
by the IMF (see Devries et al. (2011)), which extends the ”narrative approach” proposed in Romer
and Romer (2010) for the US to a large set of advanced economies.
Exploiting both time series and cross sectional variation, we relate changes in capital adequacy
ratios to periods of fiscal consolidations. Our baseline regressions use the Tier-1 and the total
(risk-weighted) capital ratio. Both these indicators have been shown to be good predictors of bank
failure. We find that fiscal consolidations are associated with an improvement in banks’ capital
bases, a result that is robust with respect to different panel estimation approaches, and that is
strongly driven by commercial banks. Our results suggest that the improvement of capital ratios
is attributed to banks re-balancing their portfolios from private securities to government securities.
Indeed, in the context of the ’Basel accords’, loans to the private sector carry a higher risk weight
than government bonds since they are regarded as less liquid and relatively more likely to default.
Therefore, a portfolio shift from private securities to government securities - triggered by a fiscal
adjustment that lowers the risk associated with government bonds relative to loans to private sector
- implies higher values of the risk-weighted capital ratios, which in turn signals higher stability.
The literature has not yet explored in much detail, neither empirically nor theoretically, the
potential transmission from fiscal policy to bank balance sheets. To the best of our knowledge, this
is one of the first papers to provide evidence on the existence of direct transmission channels.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature and
outlines the potential transmission mechanisms from fiscal policy to banks. Section 3 presents the
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data sets that we use, the empirical approach and discusses the results. Section 4 reports several
robustness exercises. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The link between fiscal policy and bank balance sheets
A substantial body of theoretical research develops the link between monetary policy and bank
balance sheets (e.g., the literature on the bank lending channel and the financial accelerator). At
the same time, there is a remarkable lack of work that investigates the channels through which fiscal
policy can affect bank balance sheets.
While the recent financial crisis has triggered more research on the role of the banking sector in
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, this line of research is still at a relatively
early stage. For example, Angeloni et al. (2011) propose a calibrated DGSE model that includes
a banking sector and the government sector. The focus of the paper is on the composition of
the fiscal adjustment, and on its consequences for banking stability. They find that, compared to
expenditure based consolidations, labor tax-based policies attain a more rapid debt adjustment and
low intertemporal debt costs, but at the expense of higher oscillations in bank leverage and risk.
However, they do not propose an empirical test based on standard capital adequacy ratios, and on
historical data for fiscal consolidation episodes. Dib (2010) and Darracq-Paries et al. (2010) also
present DSGE models that include both a banking sector and a fiscal sector. While fiscal policy is
not the focus of either paper, Dib (2010) reports the impulse responses of bank balance sheet items
to a structural shock to government spending. In this model, bank leverage (which is the inverse of
the Tier-1 capital ratio) initially increases, but then decreases before it returns to the steady state.
More recently, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) published a report which analysis
the impact of sovereign risk on the banking system (see Bank for International Settlement (BIS)
(2011)). It highlights the main channels of transmission on banks’ funding conditions. It is note-
worthy that the described ”asset channel” is closely related to the mechanism this paper aims to
identify empirically. In particular, the BIS argues that rises in sovereign risk adversely affect banks
through losses on their holdings of government papers. As a result of a weakening of the balance
sheet funding of banks becomes more costly. Banks may therefore react to changes in sovereign risk
through adjustments on the asset side, i.e. changes in the portfolio composition. By the same token,
a fiscal adjustment should trigger more appetite for government securities by banks, as treasuries
are perceived to be safer after a fiscal consolidation.
In sum, the banks’ perception of sovereign risk depend on various determinants, notably the
contemporaneous state of public finances and the economy as well as expectations regarding future
developments. The idea of this paper is to focus on fiscal policy and to analyze empirically to what
extent a tightening in the policy stance affects typical measures for the healthiness of bank balance
sheets, notably the Tier-1 capital ratio. Following what was discussed above, we see two channels
that would establish a link between fiscal policy and banks’ balance sheets:
First, a direct channel is related to supply and demand effects on government bond markets.
The supply of new government bond issuances will decline in times of a sustained adjustment of
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budgetary positions. At the same time, ambitious fiscal consolidation efforts may be regarded by
investors as a structural policy change which improves long-run fiscal sustainability. A related lower
perceived risk of default would increase the demand for government securities relative to other asset
classes. Indeed, focusing on US treasury bills, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) show
that safety constitute an important determinant of the demand for government bonds. Overall,
which of the two (i.e. demand and supply) effects prevails theoretically depends on the specific
features of the demand and supply curves. Focusing on the banks balance sheet, we would expect
to observe an increase in the share of government securities over total assets if the demand effect
prevails, and a decrease in this share if the supply effect is stronger.
A second, and indirect, channel would be related to the macroeconomic effects of fiscal consol-
idations. If fiscal adjustment leads to an economic downturn, it would increase the likelihood of
non-performing loans and write-offs. If those effects are strong, one should observe more investment
in government securities when a country enters a period of fiscal consolidation.
Overall, the qualitative and quantitative effects of a fiscal consolidation on bank balance sheets
are uncertain and will be investigated in our empirical analysis.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Data description
We collect data from three different sources. Individual bank balance sheet data are obtained from
the BankScope data base, macroeconomic variables are from the OECD Economic Outlook data
base, and the data on fiscal consolidation episodes come from the recently published IMF fiscal
consolidation data base (see Devries et al. (2011)). We use annual data from 1994 to 2009 which is
mainly due to the joint availability of bank balance sheet data and fiscal consolidation data. Our
analysis is further restricted to the 17 countries for which fiscal consolidation data are available.
The OECD Economic Outlook data base is a standard data base on macroeconomic time series that
needs no further description. The BankScope balance sheet data have been used extensively in the
existing financial literature (see e.g. Beltratti and Stulz (2012), Dinger and von Hagen (2009)), but
to the best of our knowledge this is the first paper that uses this data set in the context of fiscal
policy analysis.
The BankScope data comprise a very large sample of banks, mainly from the US and Europe,
but also from other areas. The available data include balance sheet information and income state-
ment information at the annual frequency. Overall, the initial dataset comprises 311,345 bank-year
observations. The coverage of banks has increased over time, e.g. there are 7928 observations for
1994 and 20,558 observations for 2009, which makes our starting panel unbalanced. We exclude
the banks of countries for which we do not have data on fiscal consolidations. Starting from this
data set, we focus on commercial banks, savings banks and cooperative banks as those are the
most common type of banks in most countries, and also those that are mainly involved in the lend-
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ing business.1 We further restrict the sample to banks for which we have unconsolidated balance
sheet data. Consolidated balance sheet data which include figures for the parent company and
subsidiaries (that could be active in other branches or other countries) would make it harder to
justify the identification of a domestic effect of a fiscal consolidation on the balance sheet of the
parent bank. Finally, a very small number of banks changes the end of their business year. Since
our regressions are mostly based on changes in balance sheet items, we drop those banks to avoid
timing issues. The resulting set of banks by country and year is shown in Table 1. Overall, the
dataset used for the empirical analysis comprises therefore 161,787 observations. For around 50%
of the banks, 9 or more annual observations are available. Annual observations raise from 3421 in
1994 to 11,631 in 2009. The number of banks increases significantly in 1999, which is largely due
to an increased coverage of US banks.
Table 2 reports some summary statistics for the data set. In particular, the 10-th, 50-th and
90-th percentiles of the Tier-1 capital ratio, the total capital ratio, total assets and the return on
assets are shown. The Tier-1 capital ratio is equal to the Tier-1 capital (mostly equity and retained
earnings) divided by risk-weighted assets. Total capital equals the sum of Tier-1 capital and Tier-2
capital, where Tier-2 capital adds other classes of stocks (e.g. cumulative perpetual preferred stocks)
and subordinated debt. The total capital ratio is the total capital divided by risk-weighted assets.
The first six columns of the table show that capital ratios tended to increase, on average, over the
time span considered. However, they decreased somewhat during the period 1999-2001 and, more
prominently, in the recent crisis period of 2007-2009. Such decrease is especially marked for banks
in the top 90-th percentile. Total asset (evaluated in millions of US dollars) dropped significantly
in 1999, mainly due to the fact that many small banks were added to the data set in this year.
Finally, the return on assets decreased remarkably in the context of the 2007-2009 global financial
crisis.
Regarding data accuracy, we note that since e.g. investors’ decisions or regulation depend on end-
of-period balance-sheet information. Therefore, banks might have an incentive to ”window dress”
their accounts, i.e., to implement some strategic changes (portfolio changes) are not necessarily
implemented at the end of year t but postponed to year t+1. While this is always an issue in
studies using bank balance sheet information, we do not think that it should affect our study much.
First, the Tier 1 ratio has been used in many studies already (see e.g. Wagster (1996), Beltratti and
Stulz (2012)). Second, it is not clear in which direction our results would change if banks window
dressed their accounts. Window dressing usually involves short-term transactions that are intended
to make a balance-sheet more favorable than it is. Depending on investors’ preferences, the effect
on capital ratios can go either way.
The IMF data set on fiscal consolidations is a newly released data set that compiles informa-
tion from various sources to construct a variable that captures exogenous and unsystematic fiscal
consolidation efforts that are unrelated to cyclical conditions. Along the lines of the literature on
the ”narrative approach” to identify the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy, the authors examine
1That is, we exclude investment banks and bank holding companies which make up slightly less than 4% of the
bank-year observations and, on average, around 20% of total assets.
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policymaker intentions and actions as announced in contemporaneous policy documents such as
budget documents and speeches, and identify measures motivated primarily by deficit reduction.
Romer and Romer (2010) were the first to apply the ”narrative approach” to study the effects of
fiscal policy in the US, based on a newly constructed quarterly data set of tax changes.2 In contrast
to this work, the IMF data are available on an annual basis, and cover both the spending and the
revenue side. Observations are available for 17 countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden,
UK, USA) from 1978 to 2009. A fiscal consolidation effort is defined as any measure that was im-
plemented with the intention to reduce the government budget deficit. The final figures reflect the
estimated impact of a measure relative to GDP at the time when it came into effect. Overall, the
data set contains 173 episodes of fiscal consolidation efforts. The period under investigation (1994-
2009) includes 82 episodes. The mean fiscal consolidation for this period is 0.94% of GDP with
a standard deviation of 0.89. Table 5 provides an overview of consolidation episodes by country.
During our sample period, the IMF data identify fiscal consolidation episodes in all countries with
some heterogeneity in the number of episodes across countries. A detailed description of the data
set construction can be found in Devries et al. (2011), and a comparison to a more conventional
measure, i.e. the change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB), is carried out in Gua-
jardo et al. (2011). We refer the interested reader to these papers for a more detailed description
of the data set.
As an alternative measure of fiscal consolidations, we use the year-to-year change in the CAPB.
The CAPB is widely used by international institutions such as the European Commission, the
IMF and the OECD, for fiscal monitoring. However, it has been criticized as not truly reflecting
exogenous changes to the fiscal policy stance. For example, a boom might cause capital gains and
cyclically adjusted tax revenues to rise, which can lead to an increase in the CAPB even if no fiscal
consolidation effort was undertaken. In addition, policy makers might respond to recent economic
conditions, and e.g. raise taxes when demand is high, which tends to reverse causality between fiscal
policy and economic conditions, a point noted in Romer and Romer (2010). This criticism seems
to be less of a problem for our research question since we are interested in direct effects of fiscal
policy on bank balance sheets, and not in the indirect effects which work through the economy.
Finally, it could be the case that fiscal consolidations are followed by adverse shocks in subsequent
periods due to shocks to the economic environment, reversing or diminishing the effect on the
CAPB. We deal with this last point by defining a fiscal consolidation episode as an improvement
of the CAPB of at least 0.5 percentage points. We think that this might better capture exogenous
fiscal consolidation efforts, and it mitigates the concern that small improvements in the CAPB
could be as much a fiscal consolidation as a measurement error.3 Guajardo et al. (2011) show that
results based on the narrative approach can differ from results based on the CAPB approach by
2See also Agnello and Cimadomo (2012) for a narrative study on the cyclical stance of discretionary fiscal policies
in EU countries, based on a dataset of discretionary fiscal measures collected within the European System of Central
banks (ESCB).
3We tried other values between adjustments of .3 percentage points and .7 percentage points with little effect on
our results.
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both sign and magnitude. For the reasons outlined above, we think that the narrative approach
(or historical approach) should be better suited to account for exogenous fiscal consolidations that
were implemented to reduce past budget deficits. It is, therefore, our preferred measure of fiscal
consolidations in the analysis which follows.
3.2 Specification
Our econometric approach is based on the estimation of the following panel model
yij,t =
j∑
s=1
αsyij,t−s +
p∑
s=0
γsFCi,t−s +
l∑
s=0
βsXt−s + µj + λt + ij,t, (1)
where i denotes the country, j denotes the bank and t denotes time.4 The dependent variable is
yij , which represents our banking stability measure. Xt includes bank-specific and country-specific
macroeconomic controls at time t, λt is a time fixed effect, and FCi is the fiscal consolidation
variable. For the latter, we incorporate the contemporaneous value (i.e., s = 0) and a lagged value
(i.e., s = 1) consistently with the idea that consolidations may elicit their effects with some delay.5
In principle, there might be potential problems of endogeneity arising from the inclusion of
variables measuring discretionary fiscal adjustment on the RHS of our regression equation. First,
due to measurement errors these measures might not be orthogonal to developments of the business
cycle which may also be reflected in our banking stability variable. This could result in biased
estimates due to problems of reverse causality. However, using the action-based dataset of fiscal
consolidation proposed by (see Devries et al. (2011)) described in Section 3 should to a large extent
limit such problems since the dataset was explicitly built with the aim of capturing purely exogenous
and unsystematic (i.e. unrelated to cyclical conditions) fiscal consolidation efforts. Moreover, we
include the output gap to capture the effects of the business cycle, a measure that is widely used in
the literature. Second, there might be episodes of fiscal consolidation that follow a financial shock
such as a banking crises which again would be reflected in our LHS variable and potentially cause
problems of reverse causality in our regression analysis. We address this problem by explicitly
controlling for financial and banking crises using a dummy variable approach (see Section 4.1).
Moreover, we employ a dynamic specification which controls for the lagged effect of the capital
ratio and therefore should further reduce potential problems of reverse causality.
As shown in Brewer et al. (2008), there might be variation of capital ratios that can be attributed
to the banking sector characteristics of a country. Therefore, bank fixed effects µj are introduced.
As mentioned, yij,t labels the change in the Tier-1 and total capital ratios at the bank level.
Risk-based capital ratios are meant to capture different risk profiles of banks. In this framework,
loans to the private sector carry a higher risk weight than bonds (and sub-categories of loans and
4See Romer and Romer (2010) or Guajardo et al. (2011) for a similar specification, where however macroeconomic
variables instead of financial variables are used on the left-had-side of their regression equation.
5We chose the lag structure based on the Schwartz-Bayes information criterion which suggested that the dynamic
model with one lag was the preferred specification.
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bonds also carry different risk weights) since they are regarded as less liquid and relatively likely to
default. Hence, higher values of the risk-weighted capital ratios imply higher stability.
The two capital ratios described above are commonly taken as the most important indicators for
the stability of a bank, and for its protection against adverse shocks to its assets. For example, in
an application to US banks, Estrella et al. (2000) shows that risk-weighted capital ratios are strong
predictors of bank failure, and outperform simple balance sheet ratios for longer horizons.
As for bank specific variables, we include the log of total assets as a proxy for banks size, and
the return on average assets as a measure of bank profitability. Earlier research has found that
larger banks or more profitable banks have systematically different capital structures than other
banks (see e.g. Brewer et al. (2008) or Gropp and Heider (2009)).
We include macroeconomic variables to capture the effects of the business cycle (output gap),
and other factors that should affect the portfolio choice of banks such as the the interest rate term
spread6 and the debt to GDP ratio as a proxy for the size of the government bond market. Summary
statistics for macroeconomic variables in our analysis can be found in Table 4. Further, in line with
the previous literature, we include interaction effects of our fiscal consolidation variable and the
bank-level variables in all regressions.
We apply standard panel data methods to estimate our baseline specification. This enables us
to exploit time series variation as well as cross sectional variation in the data. Since our baseline
specification includes the lagged dependent variable, standard fixed effects panel data regressions
might be subject to the Nickell bias. Therefore, we opt for the Arellano-Bond estimator that uses
lagged values of the variables to construct a large number of instruments, and that can be shown
to be consistent in this framework. As a robustness check, we also report results based on fixed
effects estimation including or excluding the lagged dependent variable. The results are similar to
our baseline estimation (see Section 4).7
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Aggregate effects
First, we look at the effect of fiscal consolidations on capital ratios in a sample including all banks.
Table 6 shows the results from our baseline regressions. The first two columns report the results
when the growth rate in the Tier-1 capital ratio is used as the dependent variable, and the last two
the results when the growth rate in the total capital ratio is employed.
Overall, we observe that episodes of fiscal consolidations tend to improve the capital adequacy
ratios of banks. The size of the effect differs between the two measures of fiscal consolidation,
but the coefficient is positive and significant for both measures. According to our estimates based
6Alternatively, we included the level of the short-term and long-term interest rates instead of the spread. We
checked that the implicit restriction on the coefficients by using the spread is not rejected throughout our results, and
our results remain unchanged.
7A completely different approach to assessing the effects of fiscal consolidation on banking stability would be a
signal-to-noise ratio analysis, as is conducted e.g. by Drehmann et al. (2011). That literature usually uses data on
the country level and tries to identify early indicators for financial crises. Our approach that makes use of data on
the individual bank level can be viewed as complementary to this alternative method.
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on the narrative measure, the expected cumulative change of the Tier-1 ratio after one year to a
1% fiscal consolidation is around 12% (which reflects the sum of the contemporaneous coefficient
and the lagged one). For the median bank in our sample, this corresponds to an increase of
about 1.5 percentage points of the Tier-1 capital ratio. The estimated response based on the
CAPB is somewhat lower, but it is still within the 90% confidence bands when we consider the
contemporaneous effect, and within the 99% confidence bands when we consider the lagged effect.
The effect on the total capital ratio is also positive and significant, but somewhat lower than
the effect on the Tier-1 capital ratio. After one year, the response to a 1% fiscal consolidation is
approximately a 9% change in the growth rate. This corresponds to around 1.35 percentage points
increase in the Total capital ratio for the median bank in our sample. The coefficient associated
with the CAPB is lower, but still positive and significant.8
The estimates also indicate that larger banks and less profitable banks tend to have higher
capital ratios. In addition, the coefficient associated with interaction terms suggest that larger
banks and banks with higher returns in the previous period respond less to a fiscal consolidation.
This can be due to the fact that portfolio decisions of the biggest banks - which are generally also
the most profitable - are primarily driven by factors other than national economic policies. These
effects are overall small: for the median bank with total assets of USD 150 billion and a return
of 0.7%, the estimated effect varies between 2% to 5% reduction of the effect on the capital ratios
relative to the baseline effect.
Regarding macroeconomic controls, only the difference in the long vs. short-term interest rate
spread enters the regressions significantly, and positively, throughout all specifications. This effect
may be related to the fact a steeper yield curve is generally associated with expectations of sustained
economic recovery, which can be also reflected in improved capital adequacy indicators. Finally, the
debt to GDP ratio has a positive effect, which is however generally not significant.
Our sample comprises three categories of banks: commercial banks, credit cooperatives and
savings banks. In order to better understand the driving forces of the result, we report results
by bank type in Table 7. For simplicity, we report only the coefficient associated with the fiscal
consolidation variable and we show the cumulative effect of a fiscal consolidation after one year,
i.e. the sum of the contemporaneous and the lagged coefficient. We observe that the cumulated
point estimate of a consolidation is positive throughout all specifications, but not always significant.
We find strongest effects for commercial banks, and non-significant effects for credit cooperatives.
For savings banks, the estimates suggest weakly significant effects or non-significant effects. our
interpretation for this finding is related to the business model of each bank category. We think
of savings banks and credit cooperatives as mostly providing loans to small businesses. Hence,
the trade-off between loan and bond investment does not lie at the heart of their business models.
However, it is a more important driver of business for commercial banks.
8Romer and Romer (2010) and Guajardo et al. (2011) also tend to find stronger effect on macroeconomic variables
based on their narrative measures, compared with alternative measures such as cyclically-adjusted indicators.
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3.3.2 Compositional effects
In this Section, we investigate the drivers behind our finding of a positive effect of fiscal consolida-
tions on banks’ capital ratios. In order to do so, we take a closer look at the components of the
capital ratios in order to inspect potential channels. Equation (2) provides a stylized definition of
the Tier-1 capital ratio
Tier1 ratiot =
Tier1 capitalt
(θ0L
f
t + θ1L
c
t) + (θ2B
i
t + θ3B
g
t )
, θ0 > θ1 > θ2 > θ3. (2)
where Lft denotes loans to firms at time t, L
c
t denotes loans to consumers (e.g. mortgages), B
i
t
denotes investment securities and Bgt are government securities. The θi’s are risk weights between
the different items. This formulation shows that risk-weighting changes across assets, also within
the asset classes of loans and securities. Generally, the Basel accords allow a risk weight of 0% for
government debt, and risk weights are higher for bank debt or investment grade corporate debt
(20%). Mortgage loans carry a risk weight of 50% and corporate loans have a risk weight of 100%.
In equation (2), we can think of θ0 = 100%, θ1 = 50%, θ2 = 20% and θ3 = 0%.
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Turning again to equation (2), note that an increase in the capital ratios can be driven by an
increase in the numerator, a decrease in the denominator or, ceteris paribus, i.e. while keeping the
aggregate asset portfolio constant, by a compositional effect in the denominator (a shift from more
risky to less risky assets). To see why this would lead to a reduction of the denominator, recall that
bonds carry a lower risk weight than loans. For the purpose of illustration, assume that corporate
loan holdings of USD 100, which have a risk-weighted value of 100, are shifted to government bond
holdings. Since government bonds carry a risk weight of 0, the risk weighted value of USD 100 is
now 0, without any change in total assets. However, the Tier1 ratio would increase, driven by a
decrease in the denominator of equation (2). More generally, any compositional effect that reduces
exposure to assets associated with a higher risk weight, and shifts the value to assets with a lower
risk weight, will reduce the value of risk weighted assets (and increase the Tier1 ratio).
In order to disentangle these effects, we investigate separately the changes triggered by fiscal
consolidations on the numerator and the denominator of equation (2). We run the regression
specification in equation (1), while using the change in the respective indicator (i.e., the numerator
and the denominator of 2, in turn) as our dependent variable. Table 8 reports results for both
capital ratios, and for both measures of fiscal consolidations. In all cases, we find negative and 99%
significant effects on the denominator. The narrative measure yields insignificant results for the
numerator, whereas the CAPB delivers a negative estimate. In every case, however, the difference
between the growth rates of denominator and numerator is significantly positive, indicating that
the main reaction is driven by changes in the denominator of the respective capital ratio.
We, therefore, focus on investigating the composition of risk weighted assets in response to a fiscal
9Note that the implementation of the Basel accords differs slightly across countries, but the coefficients reported
here broadly reflect the ones of the countries analyzed in the paper.
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consolidation.10 In particular, we test if fiscal consolidation induces banks to shift asset holdings
from the private sector towards the public sector. This would reduce the volume of risk-weighted
assets because the shift is mainly towards asset classes that carry a lower risk weight.
We approximate banks’ public sector holdings by their holdings of government bonds, and we
use different measures as proxies for the private sector. Our main restriction is the availability
of data once we zoom in on individual balance sheet items. Our broadest measure of the private
sector includes customer loans and corporate loans, investment securities and trading securities.
We further define a measure of the corporate sector as corporate loans, investment securities and
trading securities. One concern expressed in Kashyap and Stein (2000) is that some items cannot
be adjusted quickly and, therefore, may not display responses to policy changes. Kashyap and Stein
suggest to look at a subcategory that might display more immediate adjustment. We therefore
define the adjustable corporate sector, consisting of corporate loans and trading securities, as a
third measure of private sector exposure. As trading and investment securities might still include
public debt instruments, we also construct a measure that includes only customer and corporate
loans (Private loans). Due to lack of data availability, we lose around 90% of the observations in
our sample for this part of the analysis. Summary statistics are given in Table 3.
The structure of our econometric approach remains the same. However, our dependent variable
is now given by the growth rate of PrivatetPublict , where Privatet is one of the measures defined above,
and Publict is government bond holdings. This allows us to investigate the growth of private sector
exposure relative to public sector exposure. In line with our previous results and discussion, we
would expect that public sector exposure grows stronger relative to private sector exposure following
a fiscal consolidation. Taking risk-weighting into account, this would then imply a lower value for
risk-weighted assets.
Table 9 reports the results. We find a strong negative response of the growth rate of private sector
exposure relative to public sector exposure after a fiscal consolidation. The coefficient estimates
are robust for all our different measures of the private sector. This result is consistent with the
hypothesis of portfolio re-balancing towards the public sector following a fiscal consolidation.
4 Robustness
The regression results presented in table 6 have already been shown to be robust to two different
measure of fiscal consolidation, and to two alternative capital ratios. This section presents some
additional robustness tests. In particular, we provide results based on a restricted time period and
country sample. We also add dummy variables that capture different types of financial crises and
control for exchange rate effects. In addition, we present results based on alternative estimation
procedures. Finally, we show results using an alternative measure for banking stability, i.e. the
expected default probability. Results are reported in tables 10, 11, 12 and 13.
10An assessment of the response of total assets yields a non-significant estimate of the cumulated effect of a fiscal
consolidation on asset growth (results not shown, available from the authors).
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4.1 Sub-sample analysis, alternative estimation approaches and crisis episodes
Table 10 reports our test on whether the recent financial crisis period may have driven the baseline
results. We therefore run a regression on a sample that excludes data in and after 2007. In addition,
we report results excluding US banks. In fact, as reported in table 1, the panel includes a large
number of US banks, and we cannot exclude the possibility that these banks systematically differed
from the rest of our sample, in a way that is not captured by bank-fixed effects. In a similar
spirit, major financial crises such as banking, stock market and currency crises, could affect both
capital ratios and, subsequently, fiscal consolidations. Therefore, there might be episodes of fiscal
consolidation that follow a financial shock such as a banking crisis which again would be reflected
in our LHS variable. We address this problem by explicitly controlling for financial crisis using a
dummy variable approach. To this aim, we use the data set on crises published in Reinhart and
Rogoff (2009), and add crises dummies with up to two lags to our regressions. We also test if
changes in the exchange rate of the national currency relative to the US dollar - as an alternative
measure of currency distress - had an impact on the analysis. As a further check, we re-run our main
regressions excluding fiscal consolidation episodes that happen up to three years after a banking
crisis.11
The sample covers the time period in which the Basel II accord came into effect. Implementation
dates differed between countries which might have had an independent effect on our accounting
measures. To address this issue, we extend our regression by a country-specific indicator for the
implementation year of the Basel II accord.
As can be seen from Table 10, which reports the cumulated regression coefficient for FC and
CAPB, our main results remains qualitatively unaffected from limiting the time period to the
years up to 2006. The same holds true when we control for the dates of stock market, banking
and currency crises or for variation in the exchange rate. Limiting the sample to banks outside the
United States - under the narrative approach - results in a somewhat more sizeable effect of fiscal
consolidation on the two capital adequacy ratios, while the effect based on the CAPB is statistically
not significant. If we exclude fiscal consolidations that were preceded by a banking crisis, we find
an effect of similar size as the baseline regression. In addition, our results cannot be explained by
different implementation dates of the Basel II accord.
We also assess the robustness of our baseline estimate to different econometric approaches (see
table 11). Instead of using the Arellano-Bond estimator as in the baseline exercise, we run the
same specification using a least squares dummy variable (fixed effects) approach. This estimator
potentially suffers from the Nickell bias when a lagged dependent variable is included as a regressor.
In addition, we use the fixed effects estimator in a static framework, that is without the lagged
dependent variable on the RHS. Angrist and Pischke (2008) show that, under some assumptions, if
a regression based on fixed effects is efficient but one uses the Arellano-Bond estimator, estimates
tend to be too small. If one uses fixed effects estimation, but Arellano-Bond is appropriate, estimates
tend to be too big. In that sense, we can think of the two estimates as bounding the effect of interest
11This affects 16 out of the 82 fiscal consolidation episodes in our sample.
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from below and above. Table 11 reports the estimated cumulated effect of a fiscal consolidation
after one year. For all specifications, the estimated effect is significantly positive. The estimated
growth rates of the capital ratios vary between 5% and 12%, and tend to be slightly larger for the
regressions based on the narrative measure.
A further extension, we investigate the state-dependence of fiscal consolidation effects. Starting
with Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), there is now a growing literature that identifies differen-
tial responses to fiscal policy shocks when they happen in booms or recessions. In a similar spirit,
we extend our main specification and interact our fiscal consolidation measure with our financial
crisis measure. Adjusting our original regression specification in equation (1) slightly, the regression
model is
yij,t =
j∑
s=1
αsyij,t−s +
p∑
s=0
γsFCi,t−s +
p∑
s=0
φsCrisisi,t−s +
p∑
s=0
δsFCi,t−sCrisisi,t−s
+
l∑
s=0
βsXt−s + µj + λt + ij,t, (3)
which allows for differential effects of fiscal consolidation in periods of crisis and no crisis.
Table 12 presents results. We find evidence for stronger effects of fiscal consolidation on balance
sheet ratios during banking crises than during periods without banking crises. We think that this
is an interesting finding that deserves further investigation and more attention in future research.
4.2 Expected default frequencies
While previous research has shown that the capital ratios tend to be good predictors of bank failure,
testing our findings based on other measures seems to be reasonable for robustness purposes. An
alternative measure of bank stability is the price of credit default swaps on banks, which should
give a good indication on how markets perceive the likelihood of default. However, these exist only
for the small subset of listed banks, and time series are too short to assess the effects of fiscal policy.
Furthermore, reliable estimates of default probabilities at the bank level are hard to come by for
many countries.
Therefore, we use estimates of expected default probabilities of the financial sector at the country
level. Kamakura corporation provides estimates of the expected default probabilities based on a
hazard rate estimation approach taken by Chava and Jarrow (2004).12 This model is derived using
logistic regression to go beyond older credit scoring techniques and the 20- grade approach of legacy
rating agencies.
Our regressions are conceptually the same as in the baseline. However, we use only data at the
country level for this analysis since the data on expected default probabilities is not available on the
individual bank level. The results are shown in table 13. Fiscal consolidations turn out to have a
significant negative effect on the expected default frequency, even considering different quartiles of
12See http://www.kamakuraco.com/. Indicators developed by Kamakura are widely use for country monitoring
used by the private sector and international institutions.
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the distribution of default probabilities. The effect is in the range of reducing default probabilities
by .5 to 1 percentage points. Since (backward-looking) capital ratios generally correlate negatively
with (forward-looking) default probabilities, this is consistent with our previous findings.
5 Conclusion
The existing literature has not yet explored in much detail, neither empirically nor theoretically, the
potential transmission from fiscal policy to bank balance sheets. This paper analyzes the effects of
fiscal consolidations on banking sector stability. It argues that if a fiscal adjustment is perceived to
reduce the credit risk of a sovereign borrower, a bank’s demand for the bonds of this issuer should
increase relative to other assets, thereby changing the bank’s portfolio in the direction of a lower
risk composition. This would improve standard capital adequacy ratios, such as the Tier-1 ratio,
which have been shown to be good predictors for the likelihood of a bank failure.
We empirically test this hypothesis using disaggregated bank balance sheet data for 17 countries
from 1994 to 2009. As a measure of fiscal consolidations, we rely on a newly constructed data set
that uses historical accounts to build a large country panel of episodes of fiscal consolidations.
We find that fiscal consolidations indeed are associated with an improvement in banks’ capital
bases, a result that is robust with respect to different panel estimation approaches, and that is
strongly driven by commercial banks. Our results suggest that the improvement of capital ratios is
attributed to banks re-balancing their portfolios from private securities to government securities.
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Table 1: Number of banks in the sample by country and year
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Country
AT 67 74 78 127 136 142 160 172
AU 31 34 37 30 30 27 27 28
BE 76 81 85 77 65 64 60 58
CA 10 11 12 12 12 10 16 12
DE 1542 1723 1810 1790 1973 1931 1806 1686
DK 83 91 93 92 95 95 101 95
ES 131 142 153 158 149 137 146 154
FI 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 6
FR 344 344 341 321 316 308 310 306
GB 65 94 118 123 130 131 132 134
IE 11 15 16 19 23 24 26 27
IT 245 304 348 612 617 683 668 704
JP 42 164 167 167 188 800 798 772
NL 28 36 40 37 37 34 31 36
PT 17 19 22 24 25 25 23 23
SE 8 9 10 9 9 12 14 95
US 715 715 707 703 651 8788 8956 9069
Total 3421 3862 4043 4307 4462 13217 13281 13377
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
Country
AT 179 220 239 245 256 257 234 194 2780
AU 26 25 23 25 25 27 25 18 438
BE 65 67 58 53 49 41 36 33 968
CA 11 12 13 16 18 17 17 16 215
DE 1553 1442 1421 1704 1717 1698 1648 1567 27011
DK 92 90 94 95 97 97 111 100 1521
ES 152 145 148 191 192 101 151 159 2409
FI 6 8 9 8 6 8 11 11 116
FR 284 272 254 257 245 240 233 213 4588
GB 141 145 162 136 132 126 132 113 2014
IE 30 29 33 32 33 31 26 24 399
IT 688 678 676 1172 648 661 641 503 9848
JP 713 661 630 618 606 595 587 575 8083
NL 36 33 33 33 30 30 29 24 527
PT 22 21 20 21 20 22 23 20 347
SE 95 96 90 94 89 84 76 73 863
US 9134 9145 8925 8788 8633 8492 8251 7988 99660
Total 13227 13089 12828 13488 12796 12527 12231 11631 161787
Note: Bank-year observations after adjustments to the data set as described in the text.
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Table 2: Summary statistics: Banks
Tier-1 capital ratio Total capital ratio Total assets (Mill USD) Return on assets
Year p10 p50 p90 p10 p50 p90 p10 p50 p90 p10 p50 p90
1994 8.20 12.40 24.70 10.30 14.00 26.20 119.70 576.60 4995.70 0.03 0.36 1.28
1995 8.20 12.50 26.20 10.40 14.10 27.80 104.10 580.65 5218.20 0.07 0.38 1.45
1996 8.10 12.00 25.20 10.40 14.00 27.60 97.50 590.50 5600.80 0.06 0.37 1.46
1997 8.10 12.20 24.10 10.40 13.70 27.30 77.50 543.00 5531.40 0.08 0.38 1.55
1998 8.50 14.30 30.60 10.30 15.15 31.50 68.40 503.20 5475.70 0.08 0.37 1.49
1999 9.60 14.80 30.40 10.80 15.70 31.40 24.71 117.07 1729.30 0.08 0.79 1.62
2000 9.50 14.20 29.90 10.60 15.20 31.00 25.35 123.04 1804.90 0.05 0.84 1.73
2001 9.40 13.80 28.00 10.70 14.90 29.20 27.98 133.64 1925.33 0.02 0.79 1.65
2002 9.50 13.90 28.40 10.70 15.00 29.50 29.81 143.06 2024.90 0.03 0.84 1.74
2003 9.60 13.90 29.10 10.80 15.10 30.30 31.21 153.31 2089.90 0.07 0.83 1.75
2004 9.50 13.90 29.20 10.70 15.00 30.20 32.70 165.30 2291.50 0.10 0.84 1.75
2005 9.60 13.80 29.50 10.80 14.90 30.40 34.45 172.52 2190.21 0.12 0.85 1.84
2006 9.60 13.70 30.30 10.76 14.80 31.24 35.28 180.18 2375.47 0.10 0.83 1.82
2007 9.50 13.50 30.10 10.60 14.50 30.40 37.36 189.84 2530.90 0.00 0.72 1.71
2008 9.30 13.00 27.40 10.60 14.30 27.60 40.72 203.72 2668.95 -0.97 0.43 1.49
2009 9.41 13.17 25.66 10.60 14.44 26.00 43.98 215.77 2666.71 -1.49 0.34 1.35
Note: p10, p50 and p90 are the 10%, 50% and 90% percentiles over all banks in a given year. Return on assets is
the return on average assets.
Table 3: Constructed bank variables
Private sector Corporate sector Adj corp sector Private loans
Year p10 p50 p90 p10 p50 p90 p10 p50 p90 p10 p50 p90
1994 11.68 33.74 60.88 1.79 17.28 33.52 0.92 11.80 28.49 2.92 12.44 40.52
1995 13.72 27.96 55.64 6.62 14.85 29.25 3.00 12.11 27.08 3.37 15.85 54.34
1996 13.79 30.36 97.50 7.22 16.45 51.33 2.97 13.77 47.84 3.84 18.30 66.35
1997 11.80 31.13 108.20 6.24 17.49 65.20 3.65 15.67 61.47 4.68 22.11 84.39
1998 12.99 34.73 127.17 6.97 18.86 80.60 4.45 16.41 67.72 6.21 28.42 113.59
1999 6.92 20.80 61.34 4.04 11.57 33.23 2.70 9.85 31.33 6.11 31.30 144.29
2000 7.35 19.63 62.55 3.89 10.53 33.35 2.64 9.32 32.36 7.17 36.72 200.67
2001 7.09 19.45 69.00 3.91 9.73 34.10 2.50 8.38 31.46 7.28 38.52 247.64
2002 7.56 20.61 93.86 4.02 10.53 45.23 2.83 9.16 41.56 6.44 37.51 281.00
2003 8.22 24.32 125.36 4.72 12.38 59.89 3.11 10.69 58.11 6.51 35.60 325.20
2004 8.84 26.34 154.02 4.97 12.87 70.00 3.22 11.49 68.47 6.57 34.71 349.38
2005 5.63 19.58 203.64 3.48 10.62 92.93 2.42 8.79 90.26 4.90 27.96 284.84
2006 5.58 19.16 301.48 3.42 10.30 151.63 2.54 8.54 148.60 4.97 27.69 298.37
2007 6.11 21.60 317.86 3.68 11.74 159.43 2.88 9.69 153.58 5.16 29.67 315.30
2008 6.96 24.16 307.22 3.67 11.48 131.68 2.92 10.71 138.58 4.98 24.09 282.90
2009 4.34 15.20 106.94 2.39 7.55 46.32 1.06 5.68 41.87 2.95 13.63 111.77
Note: p10, p50 and p90 are the 10%, 50% and 90% percentiles over all banks in a given year. Private sector includes
corporate and customer loans, trading and investment securities. Corporate sector includes corporate loans, trading
and investment securities. Adjustable corporate sector includes corporate loans and trading securities. Private loans
includes corporate loans and customer loans. Numbers are relative to holdings of government securities.
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Table 4: Country control variables
CAPB Yield spread Output gap Debt to GDP
Year p10 p50 p90 p10 p50 p90 p10 p50 p90 p10 p50 p90
1994 -0.74 0.57 1.69 1.37 2.01 3.39 -4.57 -1.34 -0.65 0.47 0.71 1.21
1995 -5.59 -0.03 1.35 0.96 1.92 2.59 -3.21 -0.95 -0.34 0.52 0.70 1.23
1996 -0.47 1.56 6.60 1.00 2.38 3.33 -3.50 -1.07 0.19 0.51 0.73 1.29
1997 0.02 0.92 2.19 0.16 2.12 2.60 -1.85 -0.60 1.34 0.52 0.72 1.28
1998 -1.44 0.21 1.86 -0.68 0.80 1.18 -1.14 0.21 1.14 0.53 0.70 1.23
1999 -0.92 0.22 1.25 0.28 1.67 1.81 -1.28 0.76 2.19 0.47 0.67 1.26
2000 -1.08 -0.41 1.82 -0.45 1.09 1.41 0.50 1.87 2.92 0.39 0.64 1.22
2001 -2.20 -1.27 1.47 0.48 0.80 1.29 -0.39 0.68 2.33 0.37 0.62 1.21
2002 -2.68 -0.86 1.23 1.10 1.57 2.66 -1.35 -0.28 0.96 0.35 0.60 1.19
2003 -1.27 -0.04 0.72 0.86 1.80 1.96 -2.40 -0.82 0.46 0.34 0.61 1.17
2004 -1.23 0.10 1.66 0.31 2.00 2.32 -1.93 -0.16 1.26 0.33 0.62 1.17
2005 -2.29 0.34 2.33 -0.28 1.20 1.37 -1.72 0.12 1.91 0.33 0.61 1.20
2006 -0.72 0.37 2.29 -0.37 0.71 1.37 0.20 0.64 3.56 0.29 0.61 1.17
2007 -1.32 -0.36 1.08 -0.67 0.02 0.61 0.21 2.10 4.34 0.29 0.62 1.13
2008 -5.18 -0.72 0.04 -0.90 -0.27 0.46 -1.61 0.33 2.24 0.41 0.67 1.15
2009 -4.65 -2.88 -0.84 1.61 2.46 3.08 -8.86 -4.92 -3.23 0.52 0.73 1.28
Note: p10, p50 and p90 are the 10%, 50% and 90% percentiles over all countries in a given year. Variables
are as defined in the text.
Table 5: Summary statistics: Consoli-
dation data by country over the sample
period
Country # FC Mean FC
Austria 4 0.346
Australia 6 0.155
Belgium 3 0.191
Canada 4 0.183
Denmark 1 0.019
Finland 4 0.426
France 5 0.113
Germany 10 0.439
Ireland 1 0.296
Italy 9 0.824
Japan 7 0.261
Netherlands 2 0.138
Portugal 6 0.313
Spain 4 0.303
Sweden 5 0.549
United Kingdom 6 0.164
United States 5 0.136
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Table 6: Regressions of the change in capital ratios on fiscal consolidations and controls
Tier 1 capital ratio Tier 1 capital ratio Total capital ratio Total capital ratio
lagged dep -0.015 -0.015 -0.018 -0.017
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
FCt 0.082 0.044
(0.022) (0.023)
FCt−1 0.044 0.053
(0.020) (0.018)
CAPBt 0.015 0.015
(0.009) (0.008)
CAPBt−1 0.033 0.023
(0.009) (0.008)
FCtSIZEt−1 -0.011 -0.007
(0.003) (0.003)
FCt−1SIZEt−1 -0.004 -0.006
(0.003) (0.002)
FCtROAAt−1 -0.007 0.002
(0.009) (0.010)
FCt−1ROAAt−1 -0.013 -0.018
(0.007) (0.006)
CAPBtSIZEt−1 -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
CAPBt−1SIZEt−1 -0.003 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
CAPBtROAAt−1 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
CAPBt−1ROAAt−1 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
SIZEt−1 0.166 0.167 0.163 0.164
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
ROAAt−1 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
GAPt -0.004 -0.004 0.000 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
∆(rl,t−1 − rs,t−1) 0.009 0.015 0.011 0.014
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Debtt 0.045 0.122 0.054 0.100
(0.057) (0.060) (0.054) (0.055)
constant -0.850 -0.909 -0.853 -0.890
(0.055) (0.056) (0.052) (0.052)
N 73956 73956 75038 75038
Note: Arellano-Bond results, standard errors in parentheses. First two regressions are for the Tier-1 ratio, the last two are
for the Total capital ratio. The dependent variable is the change in the respective ratio. FC is the consolidation measure
based on the narrative approach, CAPB is the consolidation measure based on the CAPB. SIZE is the log of total assets,
ROAA is the return on average assets. GAP is the output gap, rl− rs is the term spread and Debt is the debt-to-gdp ratio.
Bank-specific variables are winsorized at the 1% level.
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Table 7: Cumulative effect of 1% fiscal consolidation by bank
type
Tier 1 capital ratio Total capital ratio
FC CAPB FC CAPB
Commercial banks 0.215 0.073 0.137 0.062
(0.086) (0.018) (0.065) (0.016)
Cooperative banks 0.060 -0.059 -0.003 0.048
(0.064) (0.203) (0.057) (0.154)
Savings banks 0.082 0.018 0.192 0.030
(0.110) (0.036) (0.114) (0.031)
Note: Arellano-Bond estimates. First two regressions are for the Tier-1
ratio, the last two are for the Total capital ratio. The dependent variable
is the change in the respective ratio. All regressions include the full set of
control variables as in the main regression. Table compares cumulative
effects for different bank types. FC is the consolidation measure based
on the narrative approach, CAPB is the consolidation measure based
on the CAPB. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 8: Cumulative effect of a 1% fiscal consolidation
Tier 1 capital ratio Total capital ratio
FC CAPB FC CAPB
Numerator -0.004 -0.033 -0.013 -0.043
(0.021) (0.011) (0.023) (0.010)
Denominator -0.135 -0.100 -0.118 -0.093
(0.028) (0.012) (0.031) (0.012)
Difference 0.131 0.067 0.105 0.050
(0.036) (0.016) (0.038) (0.015)
Note: Arellano-Bond estimates. FC is the consolidation measure
based on the narrative approach, CAPB is the consolidation mea-
sure based on the CAPB. The dependent variable is the change
in the numerator or denominator of the respective capital ratio.
All regressions include the full set of control variables as in the
main regression. Each entry reports the cumulative effect of a
consolidation after one year. The results for the difference are
based on Welsh’s t-test. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 9: Growth of volume shares relative to the public sector
all priv all priv corp priv corp priv adj corp adj corp priv loa priv loa
lagged dep -0.034 -0.034 -0.023 -0.020 -0.015 -0.011 0.010 0.004
(0.036) (0.036) (0.039) (0.041) (0.040) (0.042) (0.037) (0.038)
FCt -0.154 -0.261 -0.268 -0.199
(0.220) (0.237) (0.302) (0.279)
FCt−1 -0.564 -0.576 -0.652 -0.534
(0.175) (0.192) (0.243) (0.214)
CAPBt -0.252 -0.238 -0.146 -0.317
(0.211) (0.223) (0.278) (0.255)
CAPBt−1 -0.030 -0.049 0.076 -0.009
(0.238) (0.253) (0.311) (0.292)
FCtSIZEt−1 0.024 0.034 0.036 0.043
(0.034) (0.036) (0.044) (0.043)
FCt−1SIZEt−1 0.011 0.010 0.003 0.000
(0.020) (0.021) (0.026) (0.023)
FCtROAAt−1 0.076 0.084 0.080 0.102
(0.056) (0.059) (0.073) (0.072)
FCt−1ROAAt−1 0.055 0.059 0.092 0.070
(0.048) (0.051) (0.063) (0.061)
CAPBtSIZEt−1 0.052 0.050 0.043 0.059
(0.025) (0.026) (0.034) (0.031)
CAPBt−1SIZEt−1 -0.001 0.002 -0.013 -0.008
(0.030) (0.031) (0.039) (0.038)
CAPBtROAAt−1 0.121 0.102 0.107 0.120
(0.068) (0.072) (0.088) (0.090)
CAPBt−1ROAAt−1 0.065 0.058 0.052 0.035
(0.069) (0.074) (0.092) (0.092)
SIZEt−1 -0.019 0.057 -0.018 0.046 -0.033 0.053 0.068 0.178
(0.317) (0.315) (0.328) (0.326) (0.392) (0.388) (0.367) (0.364)
ROAAt−1 -0.069 -0.087 -0.075 -0.083 -0.092 -0.080 -0.080 -0.068
(0.034) (0.066) (0.036) (0.071) (0.045) (0.089) (0.046) (0.088)
GAPt -0.129 -0.066 -0.157 -0.090 -0.171 -0.084 -0.106 -0.065
(0.052) (0.044) (0.059) (0.049) (0.079) (0.061) (0.071) (0.055)
∆(rl,t−1 − rs,t−1) -0.028 0.022 -0.024 0.037 0.027 0.092 -0.008 0.013
(0.070) (0.053) (0.079) (0.059) (0.102) (0.077) (0.084) (0.062)
Debtt -0.582 -0.499 -0.798 -0.693 -0.861 -0.756 -0.753 -0.571
(0.383) (0.367) (0.413) (0.397) (0.495) (0.480) (0.463) (0.449)
constant 0.812 0.104 1.012 0.363 1.185 0.338 0.426 -0.319
(2.279) (2.246) (2.356) (2.330) (2.822) (2.781) (3.137) (3.049)
N 3930.000 3930.000 3930.000 3930.000 3954.000 3954.000 4206.000 4206.000
Note: Arellano-Bond estimates. all priv is the entire private sector, corp priv is the corporate private sector, adj corp is the
adjustable corporate sector as defined in the text, and priv loa are loans to the private sector. The dependent variable is the
growth rate of the ratio of the column variable and the public sector. FC is the consolidation measure based on the narrative
approach, CAPB is the consolidation measure based on the CAPB. SIZE is the log of total assets, ROAA is the return on average
assets. GAP is the output gap, rl− rs is the term spread and Debt is the debt-to-gdp ratio. Bank-specific variables are winsorized
at the 1% level. Standard errors in parantheses.
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Table 10: Robustness to sub-samples and controls: Cumulative effect
of a 1% fiscal consolidations
Tier 1 capital ratio Total capital ratio
FC CAPB FC CAPB
Baseline 0.126 0.048 0.097 0.038
(.027) (.013) (.026) (.011)
Pre-crisis (1994-2006) .099 .036 .096 .024
(.034) (.015) (.029) (.013)
Excluding US .180 -.079 .125 -.084
(.037) (.082) (.032) (.056)
No prior banking crisis 0.115 0.048 0.092 0.036
(.028) (.012) (.026) (.011)
Basel II .161 .025 .128 .019
(.027) (.014) (.026) (.012)
Banking crises .128 .048 .098 .039
(.027) (.013) (.026) (.011)
Stock market crises .146 .042 .116 .033
(.028) (.013) (.026) (.011)
Currency crises .092 .048 .077 .037
(.028) (.013) (.027) (.011)
Exchange rate .125 .064 .096 .051
(.027) (.014) (.026) (.012)
Note: Arellano-Bond estimates. Each entry provides the estimated cumu-
lated effect of a 1% fiscal consolidation on the growth rate of the respective
capital ratio. FC is the narrative measure of fiscal consolidations, CAPB is a
fiscal consolidation derived from changes in the cyclically-adjusted primary
balance. All regressions include the full set of control variables as in the
main regression. Pre-crisis uses only data from 1994 to 2006. Excluding US
uses only non-US bank observations. No prior banking crisis uses only fiscal
consolidations that were not preceded by a banking crisis by up to two years.
Basel II controls for differential implementation dates of the Basel II accords
across countries. The remaining regressions uses a dummy-variable approach
as explained in the text to control for different crises. Standard errors are in
parantheses.
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Table 11: Robustness to estimation method: Cumulative effect of a
1% fiscal consolidation
Tier 1 capital ratio Total capital ratio
FC CAPB FC CAPB
Arellano-Bond 0.126 0.048 0.097 0.038
(0.027) (0.013) (0.026) (0.011)
Fixed effects, dynamic 0.061 0.071 0.051 0.065
(0.017) (0.010) (0.016) (0.009)
Fixed effects, static 0.060 0.065 0.057 0.079
(0.016) (0.010) (0.016) (0.008)
Note: Arellano-Bond estimates. First two regressions are for the Tier-1
ratio, the last two are for the Total capital ratio. The dependent variable is
the change in the respective ratio. Table compares cumulative effects under
different model specifications. FC is the consolidation measure based on
the narrative approach, CAPB is the consolidation measure based on the
CAPB. All regressions include the full set of control variables as in the main
regression. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 12: State-dependent effects of fiscal consolidation
Tier 1 capital ratio Total capital ratio
FC CAPB FC CAPB
Not in crisis .145 .042 .129 .025
(.027) (.013) (.024) (.011)
In crisis .195 .081 .225 .172
(.029) (.064) (.039) (.041)
Note: Cumulative effects of a 1% fiscal consolidation. Arellano-
Bond estimates of regression equation 3 in the text. First two
regressions are for the Tier-1 ratio, the last two are for the To-
tal capital ratio. The dependent variable is the change in the
respective ratio. Table compares cumulative effects under differ-
ent model specifications. FC is the consolidation measure based
on the narrative approach, CAPB is the consolidation measure
based on the CAPB. All regressions include the full set of con-
trol variables as in the main regression. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
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Table 13: Change of expected default probabilities
EDP75 EDP50 EDP25 EDP75 EDP50 EDP25
FCt -1.312 -0.907 -0.659 -1.385 -0.935 -0.646
(0.220) (0.315) (0.156) (0.242) (0.346) (0.166)
FCt−1 -0.019 0.087 0.147 -0.026 0.098 0.160
(0.190) (0.193) (0.244) (0.193) (0.190) (0.241)
GAPt -0.174 -0.053 -0.034 -0.101 -0.014 -0.031
(0.091) (0.049) (0.042) (0.083) (0.048) (0.042)
∆(rl,t−1 − rs,t−1) 0.001 -0.026 -0.006 0.035 -0.048 -0.018
(0.094) (0.093) (0.064) (0.170) (0.159) (0.116)
Debtt 0.032 0.017 0.017 0.033 0.017 0.017
(0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010)
Unemploymentt 0.004 0.010 -0.010
(0.079) (0.075) (0.059)
∆GDPt -11.611 -5.862 -1.384
(9.971) (6.093) (6.211)
rl,t−1 − rs,t−1 -0.033 0.041 0.035
(0.069) (0.061) (0.061)
EDP75t−1 -0.593 -0.602
(0.171) (0.177)
EDP50t−1 -0.423 -0.424
(0.091) (0.088)
EDP25t−1 -0.332 -0.334
(0.075) (0.073)
constant -2.017 -0.933 -0.933 -1.958 -0.688 -0.837
(1.112) (0.655) (0.677) (0.552) (0.585) (0.720)
N 121 121 121 121 121 121
Note: Arellano-Bond estimates. EDP75 is the 75% percentile of the default probability
distribution, EDP50 is the 50% percentile and EDP25 is the 25% percentile. The
dependent variable is the change in the column variable. The dependent variable is the
change in the respective ratio. FC is the consolidation measure based on the narrative
approach. GAP is the output gap, rl−rs is the term spread and Debt is the debt-to-gdp
ratio. Standard errors in parantheses.
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